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GENDER QUOTAS ON BOARDS – IS IT 
TIME FOR AUSTRALIA TO LEAN IN? 
PETA SPENDER∗ 
This article examines whether Australia should introduce a gender quota on 
ASX 200 boards. Although existing institutional arrangements favour 
voluntary initiatives, Australia may be at a critical juncture where two factors 
— the public, pragmatic nature of the statutory regulation of corporations in 
Australia and the current salience of gender as a political issue — may favour 
the introduction of a quota. In particular, Australian policy-makers may be 
amenable to change by observing initiatives from other jurisdictions. It is 
argued that we should maintain a healthy scepticism about functionalist 
arguments such as the business case for women on boards. Rather, we should 
invoke enduring justifications such as equality, parity and democratic 
legitimacy to support a quota. The optimal design of an Australian gender 
board quota will be also be explored. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article contemplates whether the time is ripe for Australia to lean in1 to the 
option of mandatory gender board quotas and perhaps to impose them. The 
background to the debate about gender quotas on boards and possible future 
directions will be discussed. In Australia, although there is a tradition of gender 
policy initiatives such as the Work Gender Equality Act (Cth) 2013 (WGE Act), 
and some voluntary initiatives designed to boost female representation, path 
dependence tends to perpetuate existing institutional arrangements which 
favour male-dominated boards. The path created by existing institutional 
∗ Professor of Law, ANU College of Law, Australian National University. The author wishes to 
thank Deakin Law School and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for organising the 
International Corporate Governance and Law Forum in October 2014; the participants for their 
enthralling insights; the editors for their stellar editorial assistance and Professor Jean du Plessis 
for his valuable contributions to the debate about mandatory board quotas.  
1 The term ‘lean in’ was coined by Sheryl Sandberg, who invited women to lead by raising their 
hand and stop holding back. She urged women to ‘lean in’ rather than ‘pull back’ from 
opportunities: Sheryl Sandberg, Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead (W H Allen, 
2013).  
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arrangements is counterbalanced by diffusion, where we observe the 
experimentation that has occurred in other jurisdictions about gender quotas on 
boards and borrow ideas to form our own policies.  
It will be argued that, while functionalist arguments dominate the literature and 
the debate in business circles regarding gender quotas on corporate boards, the 
most enduring justifications are normative, and based on equality, parity and 
democracy. Broadly stated, functionalist arguments contend that women make 
a measurable difference to corporate performance; the arguments reach their 
pinnacle in the business case which posits that having women on boards is good 
for business. This article argues that the business case is often misconceived 
and we should maintain a healthy scepticism about its claims. This leads to a 
broader question about what type of representation we can expect from women 
on boards and it is contended that the symbolic representation of women is 
sufficient because it signals a change to traditional conceptions of authority and 
citizenship.  
Does the current political climate in Australia favour the introduction of a 
gender quota on corporate boards? Although state involvement in corporations 
has been traditionally discouraged because they are private bodies, Australia’s 
overall approach to legislation in this area is both public and pragmatic. This 
combination results in significant state intervention in corporate governance. It 
will also be argued that we may now be at a critical juncture due to the intense 
public interest in gender as a political issue. These two factors — the public 
pragmatism of statutory regulation of corporations in Australia and the current 
salience of gender as a political issue — may favour the introduction of a quota, 
even by a centre-right government.  
Finally the optimal design of an Australian board gender quota will be explored, 
taking into account Australia’s corporations law and corporate governance 
regime and comparing it to other jurisdictions which have promoted a gender 
quota in similar areas.  
II BACKGROUND 
This article expands upon an article published in 2012 where the author 
advocated that gender quotas on boards should be seriously reconsidered for 
Australia. That article argued that the participation of women on boards is a 
measure of economic citizenship and democratic leadership, and therefore the 
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percentage of women on boards should broadly reflect their workforce 
participation.2  
The present article primarily focuses upon literature, debates and policies which 
have been generated about this issue over the last five years.  
Most of the studies of gender structures on corporate boards in Australia date 
from the early 1990s.3 In 1995, a study conducted by Korn Ferry and the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (‘AICD’) showed that the 
percentage of women on boards was about 4 per cent.4 By 2010 the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (‘ABS’) commented that there had been very little progress 
towards gender equality on boards, even though percentages had doubled to 8 
per cent. The number of board seats had changed little from 121 seats in 2003 
to 123 seats in 2010.5 
In 2012 the number of women on the boards of ASX 200 companies was about 
10–13.8 per cent6 and still disappointingly low.7 Important structural and 
situational factors were (and are) impeding women’s progress to corporate 
board positions. A serious debate about quotas was needed as part of a broader 
strategy to boost participation. 
By 2012 some soft policy and regulatory options had been implemented, such 
as the ASX disclosure obligations and the mentoring programs conducted by 
the AICD. Further, collaborative approaches between corporations, 
government and civil society were generating a strong debate and there was 
considerable societal pressure for change. However, the need for a long-term 
plan was evident, owing to the complexities of the issue, the structural nature 
of the impediments, and the slow progression of women onto boards. As a 
consequence, it was contended by the present author that coercive measures 
2 Peta Spender, ‘Gender Diversity on Boards in Australia: Waiting for the Great Leap Forward?’ 
(2012) 27 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 22. 
3 The author has been undertaking research about women in corporations since the early 1990s. 
At that stage there was very little information about gender on boards apart from the material 
collected by Korn Ferry and the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD).  
4 Korn/Ferry International and the Australian Institute of Company Directors, Fourteenth Study 
of Boards of Directors, (1995), cited in Peta Spender, ‘Women and the Epistemology of 
Corporations Law’ (1995) 6 Legal Education Review 195, 205; and also in Peta Spender, 
‘Exploring the Corporations Law Using a Gender Analysis’ (1996) 3 Canberra Law Review 82, 
84. 
5 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Gender Indicators, Australia: Leaders In Top 200 ASX 
Companies’ (Cat 4125.0, Australian Bureau of Statistics, July 2011). 
6 See the discussion in Spender, above n 2, 28–30. 
7 Ibid 28. 
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needed to be considered as an adjunct to soft options.8 To this end, it was argued 
that the quota debate should be reopened and informed by the experience of 
other countries such as Norway that had embraced the quota option. Since 2012, 
debate about gender quotas has spread like a prairie fire9 and is now 
commonplace. It is clear that a strong appetite for change persists, as 
demonstrated by the volume of commentary that has recently been published 
on this topic.10 There is enormous interest in the topic and it appears to be 
accelerating rather than diminishing.   
III FRAMEWORK 
This article examines the existing institutional arrangements in Australia that 
predict, or militate against, the introduction of board gender quotas. Certain 
current institutional arrangements may predict future legislative gender quotas 
due to path dependence.11 ‘Path dependence’ refers to the formation of policy; 
once a policy path is taken, it may become ‘locked in’, as actors responding to 
new circumstances adjust their strategies to accommodate the prevailing 
pattern.12 In this context, ‘path dependence’ describes the influence of a 
particular set of factors such as corporate ownership structures, economic and 
market conditions, history, culture and political ideology that set the path for 
regulation.13 In the context of gender equality two paths converge — gender 
and corporate regulation. Institutional arrangements which favour the 
introduction of a gender quota for corporate boards include, for example, a 
8 Spender, above n 2, 38 
9 For an explanation of this epithet see Douglas Branson, ‘A Corporate Palaeontologist’s Look 
at Law and Economics in the Seventh Circuit’ (1989) 62 Chicago-Kent Law Review 745, 745, 
quoted in Brian Cheffins, ‘Corporations’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003) 485, 493. 
10 For example, if one enters the search terms ‘gender’ and ‘quota’ and ‘boards’ into a library 
search engine (which looks for newspapers and scholarly articles only, not web based 
documents) it generates over 10 000 results since 1 January 2013. 
11 Siri Terjesen, Ruth V Aguilera and Ruth Lorenz, ‘Legislating a Woman’s Seat on the Board: 
Institutional Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors’ (2015) 128 Journal of 
Business Ethics 233. 
12 Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’ (1999) 2 Annual Review 
of Political Science 369, 385.  
13 In relation to the regulation of corporations, see generally Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, 
Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic 
Development around the World (University of Chicago Press, 2008); Peter Hall and David 
Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’ in Peter Hall and David Soskice (eds), 
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
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history of political gender quotas.14 For Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz the 
institutional arrangements that predict gender quotas for boards are the 
historical factors of greater family policy welfare provisions for women in the 
labour market, gender equality initiatives and left-leaning governments.15  
In Australia, evidence suggests that some institutional arrangements favour the 
introduction of quotas, for example, a tradition of gender equality initiatives 
manifested in the WGE Act. On the other hand, countervailing tendencies, such 
as the lack of a political quota tradition, a possible ambivalence about 
affirmative action, and the predisposition to voluntary initiatives due to the 
characterisation of the issue as one of ‘corporate governance’, may discourage 
state intervention on gender grounds.16  
Diffusion may be counterpoised against path dependence. The term ‘diffusion’ 
refers to the spread of policy initiatives from one jurisdiction to another. The 
central force behind diffusion is the uncertainty of policymakers — due to 
limited information and bounded rationality — about whether policies work. 
Thus there is a tendency to apply policies that have been implemented, and 
seem to work, in other countries.17 A process of diffusion is spreading gender 
quota laws from country to country, to transnational bodies such as the EU, and 
from public sector contexts to private boards.18 Diffusion is more likely to occur 
at a critical juncture.19 It is argued below that Australia is at this critical juncture 
now because of the intense public interest in and commentary about this issue, 
and the current salience of gender as a political issue.  
The article also considers the justifications for quotas and argues that the 
enduring justifications for quotas are based on equality, parity and democratic 
legitimacy. These justifications may be distinguished from functionalist 
justifications about quotas which are, in the author’s view, too fragile to support 
this initiative.  
14 Mari Teigen, ‘Gender Quotas on Corporate Boards: On the Diffusion of a Distinct National 
Policy Reform’ in Fredrik Engelstad and Mari Teigen (eds), Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas: 
Comparative Perspectives (Emerald Group Publishing, 2012) 115. 
15 Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz, above n 11. 
16 The voluntary initiatives are described in some detail in Spender, above n 2; see also other 
articles in this special edition. 
17 Teigen, above n 14, 115, 117, citing Thelen, above n 12, 387. 
18 Ibid 119. 
19 Ibid 117, citing Thelen, above n 12, 387. 
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IV PREDICTORS OF GENDER QUOTAS 
A Gender Equality Initiatives 
A tradition of gender equality reforms paves the way for gender quotas. Whilst 
this tradition has been firmly established in Australia since the 1970s,20 
Charlesworth and Macdonald note that some important steps were taken in 
2013 to develop Australia’s gender equity infrastructure21 through enhanced 
reporting requirements under the WGE Act.22 The WGE Act includes equal 
remuneration as one of its principal objectives and is one of six ‘gender equality 
indicators’ (‘GEIs’) against which all large and non-public sector employers 
must report. Two of the relevant GEIs are the gender composition of the 
workforce,23 and the gender composition of governing bodies of relevant 
employers.24 Although it was feared that the reporting requirements would be 
watered down with the present government’s declared determination to ‘repeal 
… red tape’, the threatened repeal has not occurred so far.25 Internationally, 
increased labour participation rates among women only weakly correlate with 
the number of women in leadership positions in the corporate sector.26 
Australian data reflect the same pattern. In September 2013, the women’s 
employment rate in Australia was 55.8 per cent compared to 67.4 per cent for 
men.27 The employment rate for women aged 25 to 54 years in Australia (72.3 
per cent) in the same period showed that it is low compared to the same cohort 
in similar economies, for example Scandinavia (around 80 per cent) and the 
20 For an overview of this tradition, see Jean du Plessis, James O’Sullivan and Ruth Rentschler, 
‘Multiple Layers of Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: To Force or Not to Force?’ (2014) 
19(1) Deakin Law Review 1, 49–50. 
21 Sara Charlesworth and Fiona Macdonald, ‘Women, Work and Industrial Relations in Australia 
in 2013’ (2014) 56 Journal of Industrial Relations 381, 391 relying upon Rubery’s concept of 
‘gender-equality-friendly’ policy and regulatory settings which promote women’s 
empowerment and continuity in employment, including institutional arrangements and 
infrastructure such as childcare: see Jill Rubery, ‘Gender and Regulation: The Use and Misuse 
of the Gender Equality Cause’ (Paper presented at the 2nd Conference of the Regulating for 
Decent Work Network, International Labour Office, Geneva, 6–8 July 2011). 
22 Department of Employment, The Workplace Gender Equality (Matters in relation to Gender 
Equality Indicators) Instrument 2013 (No 1). 
23 Ibid Sch 1 Item 1. 
24 Ibid Item 2. 
25 ‘Govt Avoids Fight over Gender Reporting’, AAP General News Wire, 4 April 2014; ‘Gender 
Reporting Not Part of Repeal: Govt.’, AAP General News Wire, 19 March 2014. 
26 Rohini Pande and Deanna Ford, ‘Gender Quotas and Female Leadership’ (Background Paper, 
World Development Report 2012, World Bank, 2011) 5. 
27 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Labour Force Australia’ (Cat No 6202.0, Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, September 2013).  
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Netherlands (78.9 per cent).28 Similarly, the employment rate for Australian 
women with children under 16 years of age (62 per cent) is low in comparison 
with the OECD average (66 per cent).29  
The debate about board gender quotas is focused upon a very particular slice of 
female economic participation, primarily women on the boards of ASX 200 
companies. Achieving the representation in this segment may not deliver 
general welfare for women, although the effects of mentoring and symbolic 
representation may see a trickle-down in the labour force within the private 
sector, including corporations, and in the public sphere.30 Symbolic 
representation will be discussed in more detail below. 
V CONTRAINDICATIONS FOR GENDER QUOTAS 
There are some contraindications for quotas in Australia. First, there is a 
perception of unfairness about affirmative action and a stigmatisation of 
beneficiaries that must be managed; secondly, quotas raise questions about the 
proportional or optimal regulation of the private sector.  
A A Perceived Unfairness? 
The main argument against quota reforms is that they are unfair or 
discriminatory and will bring undeserving and insufficiently qualified women 
into decision-making bodies.31 It is interesting to scrutinise this perception of 
unfairness. As noted by Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz, gender quota legislation 
must negotiate two interrelated ethical problems: first, that in a pre-legislation 
environment, women may be underrepresented despite their equal competence; 
and, second, that after quota legislation is passed, women may be appointed 
directors of companies, even though they are not the most qualified 
candidates.32 This dilemma challenges the centrality of merit as the criterion 
28 Organisation for Economic and Co-operative Development (OECD), LFS for Women Aged 
24–54 Employment to Population Ratio (2013) OECD StatExtracts <http://stats.oecd.org/>. 
29 Organisation for Economic and Co-operative Development (OECD), Maternal Employment 
Rates (2012) OECD Family Database LMF1.2 <http://www.oecd.org/social/ 
soc/oecdfamilydatabase.htmlabour_market>. 
30 See the discussion in Nina Smith, ‘Quota Regulations of Gender Composition on Boards of 
Directors’ (2014) 12 CESifo DICE Report 42, 47–8. 
31 Eléonore Lépinard and Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘Gender Quotas: Towards Parity Governance?’ 
(Policy Brief No 2013/08, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University 
Institute, 2013) 4. 
32 Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz, above n 11, 234. 
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for the selection of candidates. However there has been a significant critique of 
the very concept of merit in the literature over many decades,33 and it is clear 
that the presence of men on boards may be for reasons other than merit, such 
as informal networking, or simply the accumulation of power.34 Khurana’s 
study of US CEOs demonstrates homogeneity in their demographic 
characteristics such as gender, age, occupation, class and status35 which led 
Khurana to conclude that the process of recruitment was closed.36 This is not 
consistent with a merit-based system of recruitment. 
Nevertheless, although mandated affirmative action programs may increase the 
representation of women on boards, the negative reactions to affirmative action 
of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries need to be carefully managed.37 
Whelan and Wood have compared the negative reactions to affirmative action 
that are still observable in the US, despite the policy operating there for more 
than 30 years, and those in Norway, where there has been a general acceptance 
of quotas after only five years.38 While it is tempting to argue that the non-
beneficiaries will eventually adjust, the sense of grievance may be exacerbated 
by arguments that treat the recruitment of women directors as a zero-sum game. 
In other words, every time a woman is recruited a man misses out.39 The 
plausibility of this argument diminishes if the focus is upon parity rather than 
positive action on behalf of women. This argument will be explored below. 
On the potential recipients’ side, one of the major critiques of quotas is that they 
may stigmatise their beneficiaries. In the UK, for example, a House of Lords 
committee report opposed pursuing quotas except as an option of last resort 
because, among other things, the committee felt that they ‘risk fostering the 
perception — though entirely incorrect — that women on boards were not there 
by merit’.40 On the other hand, Dhir’s survey of the women directors appointed 
33 See, eg, Clare Burton, Redefining Merit, Affirmative Action Agency Monograph No 2 (1988); 
Margaret Thornton, ‘Affirmative Action, Merit and the Liberal State’ (1985) 2 Australian 
Journal of Law and Society 28. 
34 Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, above n 31, 4. 
35 Rakesh Khurana, Searching for the Corporate Savior (Princeton University Press, 2002) 84. 
36 Ibid 29. 
37 Jennifer Whelan and Robert Wood, ‘Targets and Quotas for Women in Leadership: A Global 
Review of Policy, Practice and Psychological Research’ (Research Paper, Centre for Ethical 
Leadership, Melbourne Business School 2012) 22 <https://cel.edu.au/>. 
38 Ibid 27. 
39 See, eg, the speculation by Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler that male directors will need 
to be removed from boards in the ASX 200 in order for the targets proposed by the Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner in 2010 to be met in the recommended period: above n 20, 38. 
40 House of Lords European Union Committee, UK Parliament, Women on Boards Report (2012) 
27 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/58/58.pdf>. 
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under Norway’s quota legislation found that they did not feel stigmatised.41 
Further, only a very small minority attributed any differential treatment to 
gender.42 One participant, for example, considered that all newcomers to an 
organisation would be subjected to enhanced scrutiny and to the expectation 
that they would ‘earn [their] spurs’.43 
B Proportional Regulation of the Private Sector 
Although states have the power to control corporate elites and regulate 
corporate board membership by legislation, neoliberal values emphasise the 
private nature of corporate enterprise and assert that the role of the state should 
be confined to setting the basic rules of corporate conduct; the state should not 
assertively intervene in the operations of corporations.44 On this argument, the 
metric of shareholder value should be the primary impetus for corporate 
decision-making. Similar arguments are made about the proprietary rights of 
shareholders which protect them from undue state intervention.45  
Neoliberalism features prominently in US debates about corporate regulation.46 
In Australia, while neoliberal arguments exert some influence, legislators tend 
to be more focused upon public ordering and pragmatism than their US 
counterparts.47 This approach is ‘public’ in the sense that corporations are 
increasingly viewed as public bodies and legislation in Australia is not 
predicated upon a characterisation of them as private, contractually-constituted 
41 Aaron Dhir, ‘Norway’s Socio-Legal Journey: A Qualitative Study of Boardroom Diversity 
Quotas’ (Research Paper No 65, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Osgoode Hall Law 
School, 2014) 31–5 <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2488153>. 
42 Ibid 33. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Eelke Michiel Heemskerk and Meindert Fennema, ‘Women on Board: Female Board 
Membership as a Form of Elite Democratization’ (2014) 15 Enterprise & Society 252, 260. 
45 Fredrik Engelstad, ‘Limits to State Intervention into the Private Sector Economy: Aspects of 
Property Rights in Social Democratic Societies’ in Fredrik Engelstad and Mari Teigen (eds), 
Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas: Comparative Perspectives (Emerald Group Publishing, 
2012) 235, 260. 
46 Angus Corbett and Peta Spender, ‘Corporate Constitutionalism’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 
147, 148; Michelle Welsh et al, ‘The End of the “End of History for Corporate Law”?’ (2014) 
29 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 147, 152–3.  
47 For a discussion of a pragmatism and public policy concerns in Australian corporate law, see 
Corbett and Spender, above n 46. The differences between US corporate law and other common 
law jurisdictions are discussed in Jennifer Hill, ‘Regulatory Show and Tell: Lessons from 
International Statutory Regimes’ (2008) 33 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 819. 
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associations.48 ‘Pragmatism’ describes the tendency of Australian corporate 
regulation to pragmatically respond to scandals and crises rather than being 
driven by principle or ideology. After a flurry of activity at the turn of the 
present century which sought to reform corporate law through a comprehensive 
economic policy framework, Australian corporate law has settled back into its 
usual cycle of reactive rather than proactive legislation,49 frequently ‘track[ing] 
the contours of local scandals’.50 There is a general recognition that some 
interference with the market is a necessary compromise although the 
appropriateness of individual policy initiatives is often contentious.51 
Importantly, state involvement in corporate activity has not withered away52 
and the shift to federal legislation following a referral of power by the states in 
2000 has probably intensified the involvement of the state in corporate 
governance.53  
Consequently, Australian corporate law and governance is characterised by 
pragmatism and a public dimension that might justify higher levels of 
intervention by statutory regulation than in other jurisdictions.54  
VI JUSTIFICATIONS 
As discussed above, the international spread of corporate board quotas may 
occur by a process of diffusion which prompts changes in the social acceptance 
of public policies. This can occur through media action,55 or more broadly via 
48 David Ciepley, ‘Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation’ 
(2013) 107 American Political Science Review 139, 139; Welsh et al, above n 46. 
49 Sandra Berns and Paula Baron, Company Law and Governance: An Australian Perspective 
(Oxford University Press Australia, 1998) 50. 
50 Jennifer Hill, ‘The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate 
Governance’ [a review of Jeffrey N Gordon and Mark J Roe (eds), Convergence and 
Persistence in Corporate Governance (2004)] (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 749, 751.  
51 Robert Baxt, ‘Thinking about Regulatory Mix — Companies and Securities, Tax and Trade 
Practices’ in Peter Grabosky and John Braithwaite (eds), Business Regulation and Australia’s 
Future (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1993) 117, 118. 
52 Stephen Bottomley, The Constitutional Corporation: Rethinking Corporate Governance 
(Ashgate, 2007) 33. 
53 Michael Whincop, An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy of Corporate Law (Ashgate, 
2001) 16–17. 
54 Welsh et al, above n 46, 148, 163–4. 
55 Celia De Anca and Patricia Gabaldon, ‘The Media Impact of Board Member Appointments in 
Spanish-Listed Companies: A Gender Perspective’ (2014) 122 Journal of Business Ethics 425.  
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public commentary.56 If change is promoted by diffusion, what are the 
justifications for a gender quota?  
A Functionalist Justifications 
Most of the arguments made in support of gender quotas on boards are 
functionalist in the sense that they assert that ‘women make a difference 
somehow’.57 Logically, it would seem that the right to equality should be the 
primary justification; however, functionalist arguments dominate the literature. 
Suk suggests that the equality of opportunity justification may compel the 
prohibition of discrimination against women, but is usually insufficient to drive 
more robust pursuits of diversity, such as affirmative action or quotas.58 
Functionalist arguments in this area focus upon the so-called ‘business case’ 
for women’s representation on boards. Clearly the business case justification 
‘appeals to a culture steeped in shareholder value as the metric for corporate 
decision making’.59 It is difficult to ‘sell’ quotas which are justified only by 
moral or normative considerations. Moreover, the business case is appealing 
because it avoids the zero-sum mentality that accompanies equal opportunity 
claims. The business case is a story in which everyone wins, women get 
opportunities, and businesses get rich. It therefore ameliorates the negativity of 
the zero-sum analysis where women get opportunities at the expense of men.60 
B Healthy Scepticism about the Business Case 
As stated above, the business case for gender diversity on boards contends that 
having women on boards is good for business. This can be ‘measured’ by a 
multiplicity of factors such as financial performance, customer base or 
stakeholder relations. For example, when introducing a market initiative to 
encourage gender diversity in the Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations, the ASX stated:  
56 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Three Normative Models of Democracy’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton University 
Press, 1996) 21. 
57 Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, above n 31, 4. 
58 Julie C Suk, ‘Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards’ 
(2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 449, 452. 
59 Deborah L Rhode and Amanda K Packel, ‘Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much 
Difference Does Difference Make?’ (2014) 39 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 377, 383. 
60 Suk, above n 58, 463–4. 
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Research has shown that increased gender diversity on boards is 
associated with better financial performance.61 
Chapple and Humphrey responded that this claim by the ASX  
is puzzling because a positive association between gender diversity and 
performance has not been convincingly established in the available 
academic literature.62 
Most academics and commentators who write about corporate gender quotas 
seem to feel compelled to address the business case. However, some of the 
claims made under the business case are outlandish, implausible, essentialist or 
based on very small samples. Examples of some of the claims are that women 
are less likely to tolerate corporate crime, women on boards are more caring 
and women on boards are less likely to engage in tax avoidance.63   
Academics and commentators then commonly reject the methodology adopted 
by advocates of the business case.64 The methodology of the business case 
remains problematic because of the challenges it poses to logical assessment, 
including the difficulty in finding a counterfactual scenario,65 or applying the 
difference-in-difference method,66 or deciding whether a correlation proves 
causality, or whether a reverse causality is in operation.67 The classic reverse 
causality problem is demonstrated by the aforementioned ASX comment that 
corporations with women on their boards are stronger financial performers. The 
problem of determining causation lies in the fact that strong financial 
performers may encourage women to join their boards for all sorts of reasons, 
so the causative factors may actually operate in reverse: rather than board 
61 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations with 2010 Amendments (Australian Securities Exchange, 2nd ed, 2010) 25.  
62 Larelle Chapple and Jacquelyn E Humphrey, ‘Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial 
Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance’ (2014) 122 Journal of Business Ethics 
709, 711. 
63 These claims are all based on published studies but have not been cited because it is not the 
author’s intention to single out individual articles for critique. 
64 Note, for example, the comments of Chapple and Humphrey: ‘[W]e find no compelling 
evidence of a clear performance differential between firms with and without female directors’: 
above n 62, 710. 
65 Smith, above n 30, 47. 
66 Pande and Ford, above n 26, 22. 
67 Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler, above n 20, 3–4. 
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diversity driving profitability, the latter encourages the former.68 Chapple and 
Humphrey have suggested   
that there are plausible circumstances in which a firm that is larger, more 
established and in a particular industry may ‘trade up’ to diversity as a 
business proposition, but not necessarily for clear-cut quantifiable economic 
reasons.69 
Moreover, the performance of a corporation is multifaceted. For this reason the 
attribution of corporate performance to individuals may be misconceived and 
an example of the ‘romance of leadership’ where organisational performance is 
disproportionately attributed to the qualities of leaders.70 Moreover, corporate 
performance is often measured by the short-term reaction of the market to 
changes in board membership rather than long term financial performance.71  
It can become dangerous when women are singled out because of their gender 
when the performance of a company is clearly multifaceted. For example, Du 
Plessis, Saenger and Foster state as follows: 
What the actual effect of [the appointment of more women as senior 
executives and to boards] will be from a business point of view is impossible 
to predict. However, that women will have a bigger say in the corporate world 
in, say, five years’ time, is beyond dispute. … In fact, this prediction brings 
with it a huge responsibility on women to live up to the expectations that 
improved gender balance will lead to improvements.72  
This statement typifies the problem with the business case. On the one hand, 
there is no certainty that women make a difference to business performance, yet 
it is on the basis of this justification that they are obliged to live up to our 
expectations and ‘earn their stripes’. That is not a value that should be applied 
in this case. It is necessary therefore to examine more enduring justifications. 
68 Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull and Karin Vetter, ‘Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?”’ (2013) 118 Journal of Business 
Ethics 61, 65. 
69 Chapple and Humphrey, above n 62, 710. 
70 James Meindl, ‘Reinventing Leadership: A Radical, Social Psychological Approach’ in J Keith 
Murnighan (ed), Social Psychology in Organizations (Prentice Hall, 1993) 89; James R Meindl, 
Sanford B Ehrlich and Janet M Dukerich, ‘The Romance of Leadership’ (1985) 30 
Administrative Science Quarterly 78. 
71 Smith, above n 30, 46; Pande and Ford, above n 26, 27. 
72 Jean du Plessis, Ingo Saenger and Richard Foster, ‘Board Diversity or Gender Diversity? 
Perspectives from Europe, Australia and South Africa’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 207, 249. 
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C Enduring Justifications  
In the present author’s view the best justifications for gender equality on 
corporate boards are normative, and include equality, parity and democratic 
legitimacy. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
1 Equality  
The usual justification for state action in promoting gender equality on the 
boards of corporations recognises the fundamental right of equality between 
men and women that is guaranteed, for example, under article 3 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.73 The right to equality 
has a negative dimension that prohibits discrimination between women and 
men, and a positive dimension that legitimises affirmative action by specifically 
supporting persons who are members of the underrepresented sex.   
While the right to equal treatment is a familiar and fundamental civil and 
political right, it is necessary to examine how that right can be re-articulated to 
justify changes in the private sector. This involves an analysis of parity and 
democratic legitimacy. 
2 Parity  
The notion of an underrepresented sex introduces the concept of parity. Parity 
reaffirms the unity, rather than division, of society by requiring that the two 
complementary halves of humanity (male and female) be represented. 74 ‘Parity 
democracy’ is not primarily aimed at enhancing women’s opportunities as 
individuals or even as a group. Its primary purpose is to legitimise the exercise 
of political, economic and social power by larger institutions. The democratic 
republic, as the largest institution, must represent all people — both male and 
female. The new model embraces gender balance as a collective democratic 
undertaking rather than as a means of achieving equal opportunity for a 
minority group.75 
Drawing on Pateman’s work on the sexual contract,76 Rodríguez-Ruiz and 
Rubio-Marín argue that the disqualification of women as citizens in the past 
was a central structural feature of the modern state, where autonomous male 
73 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, UNTS 999 (entered into force 23 March 1976).  
74 Blanca Rodríguez-Ruiz and Ruth Rubio-Marín, ‘The Gender of Representation: On 
Democracy, Equality, and Parity’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional Law 287, 
289. 
75 Suk, above n 58, 452, 455. 
76 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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individuals could only thrive or continue to reproduce themselves socially by 
requiring women to perform tasks in the private sphere. It is only when women 
actively participate in the public sphere in significantly large numbers that the 
system will be forced to confront and solve the problems of dependency and 
social reproduction. Unless women are visibly participating in public 
institutions of the state, it can be assumed that the sexual contract is firmly in 
place.77  
The limitations of parity as a democratic principle have been critiqued by 
intersectional analysis.78 When an intersectional perspective is applied to 
gender quotas, it recognises that ‘identity categories such as gender, race, 
ethnicity, class, and sexuality are mutually constituted and cannot be added 
together’.79 Therefore the goals of improving women’s representation and 
minorities’ representation might run against the other.80  
In relation to gender quotas on boards, parity democracy is used by the state as 
its rationale when brokering the quota initiative. It does so to legitimise its own 
authority and to derivatively bolster the legitimacy of complying corporations.  
The operation of parity as a constitutionalised concept is exemplified by France. 
There, the first attempt to legislate for corporate gender quotas was invalidated 
by the Conseil Constitutionnel in 2006.81 Despite the fact that the French 
constitution had been amended in 1999 to permit gender parity in elected office, 
the court viewed corporate gender quotas as a separate issue from parity in 
political institutions. Thus, a further constitutional amendment was required 
before corporate gender quotas became constitutionally viable.82 A 2008 
constitutional amendment provided that the law should promote equal access 
to ‘positions of professional and social responsibility’ as well as elected 
office.83 There was some resistance to the 2008 constitutional amendment 
because it raised the question of whether ‘the principle of parity in social and 
professional matters’ really belonged in the Constitution, ‘which determines the 
77 Rodríguez-Ruiz and Rubio-Marín, above n 74, cited by Suk, above n 58, 456–7. 
78 Eléonore Lépinard, ‘For Women Only? Gender Quotas and Intersectionality in France’ (2013) 
9 Politics & Gender 276, 276. 
79 Evelyn M Simien, ‘Doing Intersectionality Research: From Conceptual Issues to Practical 
Examples’ (2007) 3 Politics & Gender 264, 265. 
80 Lépinard, above n 78, 277. This important and interesting issue is discussed in Michael Adams, 
‘Board Diversity: More than a Gender Issue’ (2015) 20(1) Deakin Law Review 123. Therefore 
the present author will not dwell upon it. 
81 Conseil constitutionnel, decision no 2006-533 DC, March 16 2006 reported in JO, 24 March 
2006, 4446. 
82 Suk, above n 58, 457–9. 
83 Loi constitutionnelle no 2008-724 of 23 July 2008 (France) JO, 24 July 2008, 11890.  
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organization of public power’.84 Nevertheless the supporters of the guarantee 
of parity in professional and social responsibility secured the 
constitutionalisation of the right, even though it had a significant operation in 
the private sphere. 
The French example is instructive, both instrumentally and normatively. 
Instrumentally, the legislation supporting the corporate gender quotas has been 
successful in increasing the number of women on boards by a healthy 
percentage.85 Normatively, it was achieved by a social and constitutional 
accord, which, it is argued, allows equal opportunity to facilitate ‘democratic 
solidarity, instead of alienating those whose opportunities appeared diminished 
by the new quotas’.86  
The moral of the story is that looking beyond the business case can sometimes 
yield remarkable dividends.  
VII DEMOCRATISATION OF ELITE NETWORKS — 
MOVEMENT FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE BOARDS 
Quotas may also be justified by the need for democratic legitimacy. Applying 
de Tocqueville’s analysis, Heemskerk and Fennema argue that a female 
presence on corporate boards acts as a democratisation of elite social networks. 
According to this theory, the state acts as a broker to break down elites, which 
allows for movement by women from public institutions into private firms. It 
84 Suk, above n 58, 459, attributing theseremarks to Jérome Chartier in the French National 
Assemby, 27 May 2008 <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cra/2007-2008/170.asp> (in 
French).  
85 In January 2011 France adopted a corporate board quota law which reserved at least 40 per 
cent of the seats for each gender on the boards of all listed companies, companies with more 
than 500 employees or revenues exceeding €5 million. The quota is to be realised within six 
years. An interim regulation requires a minimum representation of 20 per cent women by the 
end of 2013, and a full implementation from 2016: Teigen, above n 14, 128. Since the 
introduction of quotas in 2011, the percentage of women serving on boards of directors or 
supervisory boards of CAC 40 companies in France has risen by 7.4 points. In five years, the 
proportion of women in these bodies has tripled. See Ethics & Boards, Place des Femmes dans 
les Conseils d'Administration et de Surveillance (Post AG 2008 – 2013) (12 June 2014) Ethics 
& Boards <http://www.ethicsandboards.com/etudes/101-place-des-femmes-dans-les-conseils-
d-administration-et-de-surveillance-post-ag-2008-2013-1er-juin-2014>.  
86 Suk, above n 58, 464. 
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does so to legitimise the authority of transnational bodies,87 states and corporate 
elites.  
In Australia, this may be demonstrated by the movement of women from public 
sector boards onto private boards. In this case, the state has paved the way by 
appointing women to the boards of government-controlled firms which 
constitutes an exogenous democratisation of the corporate elite imposed by the 
political elite.88 In discussing the movement of women from public to private 
boards in Europe, Heemskerk and Fennema comment:  
State-controlled firms served as bridgeheads for female politicians to enter 
the corporate elite. Once their presence became more accepted, they spread 
to other businesses as well. By the mid-1990s, reluctant support for female 
inclusion emerged among the corporate elite, which led to increased 
democratization from within.89  
In Australia the appointment of women to the boards of state-owned enterprises 
and not-for-profit companies also acted as a bridgehead to corporate board 
positions. The early imposition of quotas for the state-controlled bodies allowed 
a discussion about quotas to flow from the public sector into the private sector. 
For example, targets were set in 2010 for Australian public sector boards and 
they have been realised ahead of time. As at 30 June 2013, 41 per cent of 
Australian government board positions were held by women, exceeding the 40 
per cent by 2015 target set by the federal government in 2010.90 
87 The democratic legitimacy argument may also be mobilised at the transnational level. For 
example, the draft directive issued by the European Commission on 14 November 2012 
demonstrates that the EU Commission is now ready to adopt an obligatory legal solution. The 
justification is, in part, gender parity which may extend to economic governance at the EU 
level. As stated by Szydło: ‘Because the EU mode of governance is characterised by the broad 
participation of self-interested private companies and corporations, … the institutions that form 
part of this governance system must themselves be configured appropriately. Otherwise, the 
EU’s economic governance will not be properly and democratically legitimized’: Marek 
Szydło, ‘Constitutional Values Underlying Gender Equality on the Boards of Companies: How 
Should the EU Put These Values into Practice?’ (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 167, 184. 
88 Heemskerk and Fennema, above n 44, 255. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Office for Women, ‘Gender Balance on Australian Government Boards Report 2012–2013’ 
(Research Report, Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs, August 2013) 2. 
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Therefore, in conclusion, parity and democratic legitimacy justifications for 
board gender quotas are more likely to endure than functionalist arguments 
based on the business case. 
VIII REPRESENTATION — WHAT DO WE ACHIEVE BY 
HAVING WOMEN ON BOARDS?  
The next question concerns what we achieve by having women on boards. It is 
evident that placing women on the boards of major corporations perpetuates 
elite leadership. Although this type of leadership may differ from the 
masculinist model of the ‘heroic champion with extraordinary stature and 
vision’,91 we should not necessarily expect that it will improve women’s well-
being overall, since the women involved do not represent a particular 
constituency (unlike a political constituency). What should we then expect? 
When a woman is appointed to a board there is an immediate direct increase in 
female representation in leadership positions. This is what Pitkin referred to as 
descriptive representation. Thus, where more board members are recruited 
from particular diverse demographic groups in society, the more democratic 
that society becomes in terms of descriptive representation.92 However, a 
question of substantive representation93 also arises. It is asked whether the 
representation of women’s policy interests can be improved by increasing the 
proportion of female leaders through quotas.94 This is a complex issue for 
women on corporate boards because, as Lépinard and Rubio-Marín observe, 
there is no valid research to show that women, as a collective, systematically 
have a different approach to that of men when performing as politicians, 
leaders or managers.95 
A third and preferable type of analysis is associated with the concept of 
symbolic representation: the concept that, when women are included in 
decision-making bodies and are therefore visible in the public sphere, this 
signals a change to traditional conceptions of authority, citizenship and norm 
91 Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, Leading with Soul: An Uncommon Journey of Spirit (Jossey-
Bass, 1995) 5, cited by Nancy Adler, ‘Global Leadership: Women Leaders’ (1997) 37 
Management International Review 171, 173. 
92 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of California Press, 1967) 
60. 
93 Ibid 222. 
94 Pande and Ford, above n 26, 5. 
95 Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, above n 31, 5. 
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creation.96 This potentially creates a public image of feminine leadership, which 
has the potential to generate new conceptions of citizenship and democracy.97 
IX SHOULD THE INTRODUCTION OF A QUOTA BE 
EXPECTED IN AUSTRALIA ANY TIME SOON? 
While the introduction of a gender quota for corporate boards may to some 
extent depend on the progress of voluntary initiatives, it is pertinent to ask 
whether our political/policy bodies are amenable to diffusion, so as to allow 
gender quota policy to be learnt from other jurisdictions. It is said that diffusion 
is more likely to occur at a ‘critical juncture’.98 Major change is possible at a 
critical juncture, which differentiates it from a normal period of historical 
change.99 A critical juncture can bring about abrupt institutional change, as it 
presents leaders with an opportunity to enact new plans and realise new ideas 
by embedding them in established institutions.100 It is argued below that we are 
at such a critical juncture now, first, because of the intense public interest in 
and commentary about this issue; and, second, because of the current salience 
of gender as a political issue.  
A The Current Political Climate in Australia 
Although Terjesen predicts that quotas are more likely to be developed by left-
leaning governments,101 they are often advanced by centre-right parties, 
Norway being a prominent example. The first initiative to introduce quota 
regulation for corporate boards in Norway came in a consultation audit of the 
Gender Equality Act in 1999 by the minority Conservative-Centre government 
coalition. A new motion was sent for consultation by the Labour Party 
government in 2001, but the final adoption of the quota ruling was based on a 
motion from 2001 presented to Parliament by the new Conservative Centre 
government coalition in 2003.102  
96 Pitkin, above n 92, 92.  
97 Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, above n 31, 5. 
98 Teigen, above n 14, 117, citing Thelen, above n 10, 387. 
99 Michael Gorges, ‘The New Institutionalism and the Study of the European Union: The Case 
of the Social Dialogue’ (2001) 24 West European Politics 152, 156. 
100 John Hogan, ‘Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach’ (2006) 39 Canadian Journal of 
Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 657, 657. 
101 Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz, above n 11, 239–42, 243. 
102 Teigen, above n 14, 123. 
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The negotiation between Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats (CDU) and the 
centre-left Social Democrats (SPD) in Germany in 2013 also demonstrated the 
potential for this policy to be generated from the centre-right. This resulted in 
a proposal that, as of 2016, 30 per cent of new appointments to the supervisory 
boards of publicly-traded German companies must be women.103  
In Australia, a call for a 40 per cent quota of women on boards was made in 
2010 by Elizabeth Broderick, the Sex Discrimination Commissioner.104 The 
current Treasurer, Joe Hockey, who was at that time in opposition, also backed 
quotas, suggesting that a quota of 30 per cent was appropriate.105 However, the 
then Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, said that government policy would not be 
changing.  
We are strenuously urging the private sector to act to get more women onto 
their boards. I view regulating as the last option — I want to see self-
motivated change from Australian companies.106  
B A Critical Juncture 
Australia has reached a critical juncture in gender politics since the quota 
proposal was made by Elizabeth Broderick in 2010. Although gender issues 
were submerged during the 2010 federal election campaign when Prime 
Minister Gillard studiously avoided raising them,107 gender re-emerged as an 
overt political issue in Australia during 2011 and 2012 when it became central 
to the construction of the now deposed Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, ‘both by 
friends and enemies’.108 This culminated in the famous misogyny speech 
delivered by Julia Gillard in the House of Representatives on 10 October 2012 
103 ‘CDU and SPD Agree on Gender Quota in German Boardrooms’, Spiegel Online (online), 
November 18 2013 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cdu-and-spd-agree-on-
gender-quota-in-german- boardrooms-a-934155.html>. 
104 ‘PM against Quotas for Women on Boards’ The Australian (online) 9 March 2011 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/pm-against-quotas-for-women-on-
boards/story-fn3dxity-1226018170923>. 
105 ‘Hockey Backs Quota for Women on Boards’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online) 8 March 
2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/hockey-backs-quota-for-women-on-boards-20110308 
-1bm6i.html>. 
106 ‘PM against Quotas for Women on Boards’, above n 104. 
107 Marian Sawer, ‘Misogyny and Misrepresentation: Women in Australian Parliaments’ (2013) 
65 Political Science 105, 115. 
108 Ibid 113. 
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and directed at Mr Abbott when he was Leader of the Opposition.109 Julia 
Gillard said in part: 
I will not be lectured about sexism and misogyny by this man. I will not. And 
the Government will not be lectured about sexism and misogyny by this man. 
Not now, not ever. The Leader of the Opposition says that people who hold 
sexist views and who are misogynist are not appropriate for high office. Well 
I hope the Leader of the Opposition has got a piece of paper and he is writing 
out his resignation. Because if he wants to know what misogyny looks like in 
modern Australia, he doesn’t need a motion in the House of Representatives, 
he needs a mirror.110 
The reception of the speech transformed it from a political exchange into the 
makings of a critical juncture. The significance of the speech was largely 
missed by the Australian press gallery but it attracted worldwide attention and 
commentary and in just 10 days it had been watched by more than 2 million 
viewers on YouTube.111  
As McLean and Maalsen argue, 
although there have been vocal female politicians before Gillard, such a direct 
speech on sexism and misogyny has not been delivered in the House of 
Representatives prior to this, and certainly not one that dealt with gender 
related shame in such a direct way.112  
The events surrounding Julia Gillard’s prime ministership, and the misogyny 
speech in particular, made gender the subject of public commentary in an 
unprecedented way. This, as argued above, produced a critical juncture. 
Although Australia does not have a political quota tradition113 and, at the time 
of writing, the number of women in State and federal parliaments has fallen 
from its 2009 peak,114 the public is becoming more outspoken about female 
representation in politics. After the federal election in September 2013 the new 
Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, received considerable criticism because of the 




111 Sawer, above n 107, 113. 
112 Jessica McLean and Sophia Maalsen, ‘Destroying the Joint and Dying of Shame? A 
Geography of Revitalised Feminism in Social Media and Beyond’ (2013) 51 Geographical 
Research 243, 251. 
113 Sawer, above n 107, 106. 
114 The proportion of women in Australia parliaments (in all houses) peaked at 31 per cent in 
2009 but slid to 28 per cent by February 2013: ibid. 
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decline in the number of women in the Ministry. Only one female Minister was 
appointed — Julie Bishop, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This aspect of the 
new Ministry attracted considerable criticism from both the traditional and 
social media. 
The conservative stand taken to gender issues by the Liberal/National Coalition 
government prior to the deposition on 14 September 2015 of the Prime 
Minister, Tony Abbott, may be moderated by the controversy that the issue has 
generated. It is well known that Abbott had difficulty garnering electoral 
support from women.115 Polling showed that considerably more women 
disapproved of his handling of the job of Prime Minister (54 per cent) than 
approved (33 per cent).116 This was an unrelenting theme in Abbott’s 
conversation with the electorate.   
Legislation for gender quotas on boards is a progressive gender policy. It is not 
inconceivable in the current climate that a regenerated Liberal/National 
Coalition may embrace this policy. 
X DESIGNING THE QUOTA 
There are several elements that must be considered when deciding a gender 
quota. These include the role of soft options and incentives, the cohort of 
companies that should be subject to the quota, the timeframes within which the 
quota should be achieved and the sanctions that should be applied if the quota 
is not fulfilled.  
Most commentators accept that a 40 per cent quota is appropriate when 
benchmarked against women’s participation in the labour market, which 
currently stands at around 55.8 per cent.117 The companies in the ASX 200 
should be the target group because this cohort is a standard measure used by 
investors to model the Australian share market and has been used for some time 
to measure gender diversity on boards, including by the ABS.  
Is the glass half empty or half full? The percentage of female directorships on 
ASX 200 boards was 18.6 per cent at 30 September 2014. Given that the figure 
115 William Bowe, ‘Poll Bludger: Abbott’s “Women Problem”’ on Crikey (8 August 2014) 
<http://www.crikey.com. 
au/2014/08/08/poll-bludger-abbotts-women-problem>. 
116 Roy Morgan Research, ‘Australians Support Tony Abbott as PM over Bill Shorten – but 
Neither Leader Much Liked’ (Public Opinion Poll, No 6207, 27 April 2015). 
117 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Labour Force Australia’ (Cat No 6202.0, Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, September 2013).  
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was relatively static between 2003 and 2010, at around 8.3–8.4 per cent, any 
discernible annual increase improves the situation significantly. There have 
been some years of dramatic improvement, for example the 580 per cent 
increase between 2010 and 2011. However, before we pop the champagne corks 
it must be noted that the numbers rose from a very low base in 2009,118 and that 
the ASX 200 boards are still overwhelmingly dominated by men.119  
When projected over the last 10 years, the increase in female participation on 
the boards of ASX 200 companies is occurring at a rate of approximately 1 per 
cent a year. On this basis,120 it can be estimated that, assuming the current level 
of annual growth, optimal gender representation will take about another 22 
years to attain. This is unacceptable because it does not allow the current 
generation of women entering the management of companies to aspire to board 
membership within their own working lifetimes. Therefore, 22 years is too long 
and should, at least, be cut in half to allow the current generation of aspiring 
female managers to attain board positions. This would be a similar timeframe 
to that adopted by Norway.   
The reform should occur as a composite. That is, the quota should be contingent 
upon the failure of voluntary initiatives (with incentives created by public 
procurement rules). Businesses should know that a contingent voluntary 
scheme has begun and that the quota will operate from a clear point in the future 
if the targets have not been achieved. The legislation should set timeframes for 
two phases as follows: 
Phase 1 — a five-year period during which voluntary initiatives and 
incentives are in place to achieve a minimum target of 40 per cent of 
each gender on ASX 200 boards. 
Phase 2 — the imposition of a quota at the conclusion of a further five-
year period enforced by sanctions for non-compliance.   
118 As stated by Du Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler, ‘despite the striking 580 per cent uplift 
in female appointments during 2010 and 2011, the real percentage of female directors across 
the entire ASX 200 increased only 5.1 per cent (from 8.3 per cent at the start of 2010 to 13.4 
per cent by the end of 2011)’: above n 20, 39. 
119 Ibid 49–50. 
120 This is a rather simplistic analysis of the progression of women onto the boards of the ASX 
200 and the author recommends that readers look at the detailed analysis provided by Du 
Plessis, O’Sullivan and Rentschler, ibid 35–43. 
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A Phase 1 — Expanding Voluntary Initiatives and 
Creating Incentives 
In certain contexts soft measures can work to achieve the requisite target. For 
example Finland has reached a quota of more than 25 per cent relying largely 
on soft measures such as the ‘comply or explain’ provisions in the Finnish 
Corporate Governance Code.121 However, the Finnish legislation covers state-
owned companies and excludes private companies.122 Because (as discussed 
above) the state acts as a bridgehead for women moving onto private boards, it 
is often easier for state-owned corporations to reach the quota than for 
privately-owned corporations. 
It is suggested that the Australian government should encourage the 
continuation of voluntary initiatives, and could accelerate the attainment of the 
target by additional incentives which link board composition to public 
procurement. For example, the federal and Victorian governments have 
recently linked tenders for government legal services to the performance of 5 
per cent of the value of the contract as pro bono legal work.123 This initiative 
has been successful in increasing the uptake of pro bono legal work by private 
firms. Similarly, the Spanish government has introduced a board gender target 
based on a ‘comply or explain’ regulatory approach which gives access to 
public contracts to companies that have achieved the designated target.124 The 
percentage of female directors on IBEX-35 company boards in Spain has risen 
from 6.4 per cent in 2007 to 10.1 per cent in 2010.125 Although there has been 
some criticism of the Spanish approach because the legislative requirement is 
treated as a recommendation rather than an obligation (thereby potentially 
121 European Parliament Resolution of 6 July 2011 on Women and Business Leadership 
(2010/2115(INI)), [6]: This resolution ‘[w]elcomes Finland's Corporate Governance Code, 
under which firms’ decision-taking bodies must contain both male and female representatives 
and there must be public disclosure of any non-compliance; notes that, because of the code, the 
proportion of women on Finnish firms’ decision-taking bodies is now 25 per cent and that, since 
the introduction of the code was announced, the proportion of stock exchange-listed firms with 
women on supervisory or management boards has increased from 51% to about 70%’. The 
Resolution is cited by Du Plessis, Saenger and Foster, above n 72, 216 fn 61. 
122 Act 609/1986 on Equality between Women and Men (Finland). 
123 National Pro Bono Resource Centre, Pro Bono Provisions in Government Tender 
Arrangements for Legal Services (September 2013) National Pro Bono Resource Centre 
<http://www.nationalprobono.org.au/page.asp?from=3&id=274>. 
124 Constitutional Act 3/2007 of March 22 (Spain), art 75 (‘Gender Equality Act 2007’). See Celia 
De Anca and Patricia Gabaldon, ‘The Media Impact of Board Member Appointments in 
Spanish-Listed Companies: A Gender Perspective’ (2014) 122 Journal of Business Ethics 425, 
430. 
125 Instituto de la Mujer (2011) cited by Celia De Anca and Patricia Gabaldon, above n 124.  
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lowering the likely uptake),126 rewarding private sector performance of social 
responsibilities by giving access to government contracts can be a very effective 
incentive.  
B Phase II — A Contingent Quota Enforceable by 
Sanctions 
If the target is not reached within the requisite timeframe, a further period 
would be set within which companies would have to comply with the quota, 
failing which sanctions would be imposed. Following the Norwegian example, 
a five-year period could be set to allow voluntary initiatives to operate, followed 
by the introduction of a quota which would be imposed after a further five-year 
period had elapsed. 
A survey of the sanctions imposed under gender quota laws demonstrates a 
considerable range and versatility of approaches. For example, some 
jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands and Spain, impose a ‘comply or explain’ 
model, so that if the company does not comply with the target it must justify 
this in its annual report. Shareholders can then take action to change the board’s 
composition, and stakeholders can apply external pressures to comply.127 In 
France, an appointment of board members in violation of the quota will be 
void,128 however resolutions by a board that is not composed in accordance with 
the statutory provisions will still be effective.129 Attendance fees for board 
members may not be paid until lawful composition of the board is reached.130 
Similarly, in Belgium, non-compliance with the quota is penalised by the 
nullity of the appointment of the new director, and some of the directors’ 
benefits are suspended.131 An EU Directive has suggested that administrative 
fines should be imposed and a judicial body empowered to make a declaration 
126 Pande and Ford, above n 26, 35. 
127 Tineke Lambooy, ‘30 Percent Women on Boards: New Law in the Netherlands’ (2012) 9 
European Company Law 53, 63; Celia De Anca and Patricia Gabaldon, above n 124.  
128 Code de Commerce [French Commercial Code] L225-18-1 (para 1), cited by Du Plessis, 
Saenger and Foster, above n 72, 211. 
129 Code de Commerce [French Commercial Code] L225-18-1 (para 2, sentence 1) cited by Du 
Plessis, Saenger and Foster, ibid 211. 
130 Code de Commerce [French Commercial Code] L225-18-1 (para 2, sentence 2) cited by Du 
Plessis, Saenger and Foster, ibid. 
131 Lambooy, above n 127, 58. 
                                                 
120 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 20 NO 1 
that the election of non-executive directors contrary to the quota provisions is 
a nullity.132 
In relation to Norway, Teigen has argued that ‘[t]he fairly tough sanctions set 
up for breaking the law are probably an important factor on [sic] why the 
implementation of the quota law went smoothly’.133 Importantly, enforcement 
of the law in Norway follows a three-step model. First, a company not fulfilling 
the quota target may receive several warnings; then the Business Register may 
impose a fine; and, finally the company will be subject to forced dissolution.134 
Although the sanction of forced dissolution may appear to be draconian, there 
have been no cases where any steps have been taken to impose sanctions.135 
The Norwegian system of sanctions is a good model to adopt because it applies 
a stepped series of sanctions which escalate with protracted non-compliance. 
This is consistent with the responsive approach which is commonly used to 
regulate corporations in Australia. Responsive regulation aims to achieve 
optimal engagement by users because of its focus upon compliance rather than 
punishment. This gives it the advantage of preserving the trust, goodwill and 
cooperation of businesses which are seeking to comply with the regulations. 
However, in the event that a business is non-compliant, and unresponsive to an 
approach based on dialogue and persuasion, the regulator escalates responses 
up the multi-layered ‘enforcement pyramid’, each step of which imposes 
tougher sanctions upon the non-complying business.136 
Further research into this area is needed. For example EU institutions must act 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality when designing the means 
for practical implementation of gender parity.137 It would be useful to consider 
how responsive regulation and proportionality may operate in tandem to secure 
an efficacious and fair system of sanctions. Naturally, commentators differ as 
to whether particular sanctions are effective and/or fair.138  
132 European Commission Brussels, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (14 November 2012) art 6. 
133 Teigen, above n 14, 124. 
134 Ibid 124–5. 
135 Report of the Register for Business Enterprises (Norway), cited in Teigen, ibid 125. 
136 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation 
Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) 21–7. 
137 Treaty on European Union, opened for signature 7 February 1992, [2012] OJ C 326/18 
(entered into force 1 November 1993), art 5. 
138 Compare Szydło’s view about the proportionality of the ‘comply or explain’ sanctions in the 
Netherlands and Spanish systems with Lamboy’s view that the lack of hard sanctions in the 
Netherlands law is ‘disappointing’ and Pande and Ford’s view that the Spanish sanctions had 
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XI CONCLUSION 
The time is ripe for Australia to legislate for mandatory gender quotas for 
corporate boards. Although Australian policy makers have favoured the use of 
voluntary initiatives to increase the participation of women on boards, progress 
is still too slow to satisfy the strong public appetite for change. The path of 
voluntary initiatives has been followed due to, among other things, a reticence 
on the part of government to intervene in an operational issue of corporate 
governance and an ambivalence about affirmative action. However, Australia 
has developed a relatively robust pattern of legislative intervention in corporate 
law and Australian policy makers may be amenable to allowing the diffusion 
of gender quota policy from other jurisdictions that have successfully made the 
transition. In fact, they may welcome the change because the social debate has 
reached a critical juncture where gender has re-emerged as a salient political 
issue and there is a strong appetite for change which may influence political 
leaders. Legislation for board gender quotas for ASX 200 companies could be 
phased in, with clear timeframes which are contingent upon the failure of 
voluntary initiatives.  
The change should be justified by recourse to enduring values such as parity, 
equality and democracy rather than misconceived functionalist arguments 
based upon the business case. The participation of women on boards is a 
measure of women’s economic participation and democratic leadership. The 
leadership that they provide is symbolic but has the potential to generate new 
and vital conceptions of citizenship and democracy.  
only resulted in a ‘little’ increase in female board representation: Szydło, above n 87, 186; 
Lambooy, above n 127, 63; Pande and Ford, above n 26, 35. 
                                                 
